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USING SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKING TO SOLVE 
MISSED FIREWALL ARCHITECTURE 
IN LEGACY NETWORKS 
 
Jared D. Vogel 
66 Pages May 2015 
This study is concerned with migrating traditional networks and their inherent 
firewall architecture to Software Defined Networking (SDN) architecture to provide an 
initial attempt at preventing application downtime due to hidden firewall domain rules. In 
legacy organization environments the networking engineers, firewall teams, and 
application analysts are often silo groups, but Software Defined Networking (SDN) can 
blur the lines between these group silos.  
This thesis first outlines the interworking of SDN, traditional firewall architecture 
and how it interacts with SDN, an experiment of implementation, and the resulting 
conclusions. 
Testing with SDN shows we are approaching new environments where the edges 
of network are no longer dominated by firmware on switches and routers. The 
technologies behind SDN allow for the programmability of the entire network, which 
creates a logical flow of both network traffic and firewall policies that allow us to bypass 
traditional errors that may arise from physically segmented networks. 
The physical and logical level network programming inherent in SDN allows 
organizations to merge and adapt skill sets of networking engineer and application 
developers to reduce the risk and reliance on firewall expertise. 
Utilizing OpenFlow protocols and flow table concepts presented in SDN we can 
propagate firewall rules centrally and logically, which provides end-to-end traffic with 
firewall rules in our network. Using these concepts reduces the traditional firewall 
complexity for organizations. In this study we present a paper prototype that 
demonstrates that we may add in firewall rules to a centralized instance allowing our 
SDN controllers to provide firewall protection throughout the entire network instead of 
isolated risk domains or tiers. In the prototype application developers are prevented from 
calling incorrect ports and possibly missing hidden local firewalls not previously known. 
The approach described in this paper is based on a case study of several large 
American firms. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Can Software Defined Networking (SDN) help organizations manage their 
security architecture? How can SDN help safely implement new elastic firewall 
environments within an organization? These are questions facing enterprises today.  
Enterprises today are increasing in data aggregation, data utilization and multilayered 
security architecture. According to the study Exploiting In-network Aggregation for Big 
Data Applications, [t]his generates high network traffic, which is hard to support using 
traditional, oversubscribed, network infrastructures. Coinciding with oversubscribed 
network infrastructure are common firewall policies and access control rules. 
In a traditional network, if an organization was to alter an application from using 
Hyptertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), which is on port 80, to Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
Secure (HTTPS) on port 443 and firewall rules in place for allowing HTTP, the result 
would be the failure of the application. At Oracle, inc. Bartley, et al. found that, “[a]s the 
IT portfolio grows, IT legacy investments and architectures begin to stifle business 
innovation and increase operational costs [40].” Bigger portfolios mean an increasing the 
amount of responsibilities and expertise required for application developers. Allowing 
problems like a simple port switch and firewall rule violation to occur brings applications 
down.  
“80% of unplanned outages are due to ill-planned changes made by administrators 
("operations staff") or developers [41].” This statistic taken out of the IT Process Institute 
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Visible Ops handbook shows the need for solutions in common enterprise environments. 
Colville and Spafford [42] predicted that, “[t]hrough 2015, 80% of outages impacting 
mission-critical services will be caused by people and process issues, and more than 50% 
of those outages will be caused by change/configuration/release integration and hand-off 
issues.” The misconfiguration problem explored in this paper includes the people and 
process issues in firewall policy management. Depending on the organizations size and 
business model, firewall policy management errors can be costly to overall operations by 
taking offline time sensitive revenue generating applications.  
This paper will focus on abstracted enterprise examples of how SDN can 
potentially reduce the complexity of security architectures. The primary focus will be on 
firewall consolidation to enable the deployment of rapid and secure environments, which 
should help organizations, avoid downtime resulting from an application configuration 
that violates firewall rules. Secondarily it will delve into the potential benefits 
organizations would see after implementation. Using SDN we will outline how the 
number of firewall layers in an organization can be potentially managed more effectively, 
paving the way for a new solution of using SDN. Effective management of these policies 
contributes to eliminating the process portion of our problem.  
This study will also outline how SDN is currently being used and customized to 
meet organizational needs in alignment with best practices of the Open Network 
Foundation (ONF), the current leaders in the software defined networking field. Google, 
a large enterprise currently uses OpenFlow technology. Recognizing the previous 
problems listed, the company has separated out its hardware from software deploying 
SDN switches. In the words of Amin Vahdat, “It provides logically centralized control 
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that will be more deterministic, more efficient and more fault-tolerant [43].” At the Open 
Network Summit in 2014, Vahdat explained Andromeda, their SDN based substrate for 
network virtualization efforts. “Rather than being forced to create compromised solutions 
based on available insertion points, we can design end-to-end secure and performant 
solutions by coordinating across the stack [44].” By using SDN to create logical stacks 
across the globe, they can provide elastic network connectivity and scalability. This 
utilizes the networks processing power to provide the high availability and elasticity other 
traditional organizations don’t have. 
The security examples presented in this paper include anonymous data collected 
from several enterprises currently not using SDN. They are compliant with federal 
security standards such as National Institute of Standards and Technology SP 800 and 
Sarbanes-Oxley regulation. We will test a solution that uses this anonymous data to build 
a multi layered firewall environment. With the environments built our final goals are the 
reduction of complex policies, having a simpler firewall architecture, and the creation of 
domain risk classifications, which will enable robust network architecture. In Chapter 5, 
we propose an SDN-based paper prototype that fulfills these goals.  We show that this 
prototype allows us to move an application from HTTP to HTTPS without downtime due 
to firewall rule violation. 
“Most programmers mainly focus on functionality and make security a secondary 
priority [44].” The lack of focus on network security and network flexibility creates 
common risk problems such as misconfigurations and omitted processes. Compounding 
these problems is the need to maintain end-to-end flows within an organization’s multi 
firewalled environment. Redefining multiple firewall environments or even changing 
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firewall policies to meet new application development is often overlooked. When 
changing the priority of applications organizations need to review the network and 
security architecture that operates within the organization. Even if they have begun 
implementation of SDN, Organizations still have the challenge of maintaining separate 
legacy corporate, and local firewalls. The need for a manageable combined solution is 
present, but the tools, standards and adoption of SDN are still in its infancy creating a 
challenging environment for realizing its full benefit. 
We also show that future work will be needed as the literature on aggregating 
firewall and access control language for policies fail to mention the actual limitation of 
the hardware. 
Thesis Organization 
The remaining chapters of this thesis contain the following: 
 Chapter 2 – Review of related literature covering SDN, software defined 
networking with firewalls and how current firewall environments operate. 
 Chapter 3 – Software defined networking and how it is being currently proposed, 
implemented, developed, researched and utilized. 
 Chapter 4 – Abstract organizational security architecture, firewall problem being 
proposed with anonymous data collected. 
 Chapter 5 – Using SDN to remove multiple risk environments and firewalls 
decreasing the complexity of security architecture. 
 Chapter 6 – Did it work? Proof-of-concept with hypothetical working model. 
Conclusion on results and proposals. 
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 Appendix – Scripts, possible code to utilize in implementing the proof-of-concept, 
and all pseudo code used. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
The literature analyzed for this paper includes established SDN technologies, 
established firewall technologies, and emerging concepts combining the two fields 
together. An abundance of information is present for both topics even though SDN is a 
technology still in its infancy being rapidly developed. Numerous methodologies are 
present when applying new concepts to SDN and its open source projects due the 
modularity and availability of the software. Large amounts of information and literature 
reside within the ONF, Stanford and Berkley SDN repositories. “Implementation of SDN 
is being touted by large enterprises such as Google, Amazon, and hardware providers like 
Cisco [2].” 
A large player in the SDN field is The Open Networking Foundation (ONF). 
“Open Networking Foundation (ONF) is a user-driven organization dedicated to the 
promotion and adoption of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) through open standards 
development [1].” ONF was formed due to two studies on SDN gaining traction from the 
Universities of Stanford and Berkley. “McKeown and colleagues developed a standard 
called OpenFlow that essentially opens up the Internet to researchers, allowing them to 
define data flows using software--a sort of "software-defined networking [2].” Carrying 
this SDN technology forward McKeown and colleagues formed the ONF along with 
other participating Universities and organizations.  
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According to the member listing of the ONF [3] over one hundred and seventy 
organizations and corporations are listed as members including major players such as 
Citrix, IBM, Intel, Broadcom, Dell, Cisco, and T-Mobile. With a large participating 
membership and committee the ONF has gained support among hardware vendors 
adopting the standards and protocols. Because many members are leaders in their 
respective technology fields, SDN could not be disregarded as a fad or passing phase 
technology. It has gained a strong foothold in the turning years since its inception around 
2009. 
Software Defined Networking Infancy 
The ONF provides technical documentation introducing the concepts of SDN and 
the OpenFlow protocol. Methodologies that motivate the ONF seem to have shifted from 
academic purposes [3] to more commercial. “Today, our Technical Communities 
continue to analyze SDN requirements, evolve the OpenFlow Standard to address the 
needs of commercial deployments, and research new standards to expand SDN benefits 
[1].” 
SDN being utilized with numerous approaches and problems they are solving, it is 
difficult to find research that brings fruition of working models within their conclusions. 
The ONF does provide a complete setup of architecture explanations and designs to the 
details of SDN ability and function.  Unfortunately, a lot of the literature provided on the 
front end of their foundation reads like advertising [7]. Open source organizations are 
easily found to compliment the ONF literature and provide current working projects to 
engage with [8]. The white papers on the actual hardware specification for their switches 
[13] down to the actual protocol coding and scripts [29] provided by the ONF are not 
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only comprehensive, but also allow for abstracting new theories. Entire working models 
along with associated code repositories are provided by the ONF.  
Protocols and Standards 
The intense competition among hardware vendors has been beneficial for SDN 
and the OpenFlow protocol. For example, vendors have begun to advertise how well their 
hardware is utilizing the SDN and OpenFlow standard as a selling point for cloud 
services. When researching vendor claims, however, it is considered best practice to 
check with independent third party laboratories. One such laboratory is the Tolly Group, 
which claims to be “…positioned to certify vendor solutions and thereby provide 
evidence that their products meet or exceed marketing claims [44].” The Tolly Group has 
been conducting tests recently concerning switches that are OpenFlow enabled and 
operating on an SDN. In an example test they found that, “the IBM BNT RackSwitch 
G8264 [an SDN-based switch] demonstrated up to 100 times the packet buffering 
capacity and up to 70 percent less energy consumption than competitive switches, while 
maintaining full line rate and providing 160 Gbits/second more capacity than any other 
switch tested [12].” This private competition combined with international organizations 
such as Internet Engineering Task Force and Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers has provided strong backing and standardization of the OpenFlow protocol. 
Journals and independent consultants refer to the newest version of OpenFlow as the de 
facto standard [11], however other protocols have been in development. OpenFlow being 
the standard is not without flaws as evidenced by the ONF adopting other protocols in 
development into the OpenFlow standard. “The Open Networking Foundation (ONF) 
recently embraced NETCONF and made it mandatory for the configuration of 
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OpenFlow-enabled devices [45].” Adoption of these protocols in development broadens 
the OpenFlow standard providing a wider environment in which to develop. This 
expanding scope of OpenFlow provides flexibility and depth upon to develop better 
standards. NETCONF a protocol recently integrated into OpenFlow is very useful to both 
OpenFlow and to solving this studies problem. “It provides an administrator or network 
engineer with a secure way to configure a firewall, switch, router, or other network 
device [45].” 
The open source of the controllers APIs and interfaces are concerning. “[O]pen 
APIs for security functions to SDN have not yet appeared and have not begun to 
standardize, so API incompatibilities may also cause security holes to appear [14].” 
Without a clear guidance or grasp on the controller APIs themselves, numerous solutions 
are still being proposed such as westbound models to have controllers communicate to 
each other [10] known as SDNi or vertical topologies. 
Traditional Firewalls 
Literature on firewalls and their detailed workings is in over abundance. 
Traditional firewalls have been around since the dawn of the Internet and their use is 
considered by some to be obsolete or failing [15]. Massive amount of firewall 
architecture and policies that have been created can readily find new literature and dated 
literature. Dated literature [18] will provide the framework of our firewall architecture 
due to their current and established dominance in the field [16]. Although firewall 
literature is often dated, new sources are being generated daily for new concepts and 
designs. Literature current this year continues to categorize firewalls into the same three 
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types proposed 27 years ago [17]: packet filtering firewalls, circuit gateways, and 
application gateways [19].  
Research is also being conducted on solving similar problems presented by virtual 
local area networks (VLANs) and other moving network topologies. “To reduce 
complexities in identifying various networks using [VLANs][20].”  
The limited research into modelling firewall rules and how they will fit within 
SDN is fragmented. Most research falls into two categories, identifying the potential 
mistakes or complexity of the proposals [21]. Dissertations such as [22] and even 
Sigcomm proceedings such as [HOT SDN] often conclude with more work required or a 
simple model of the structure.  
Studies on SDN firewalls are extremely rare. Applicable results on studying 
traditional complex firewalls and systems developed to quantify them such as [23] are 
available. Combining traditional firewall studies with SDN studies that begin to step 
forward in eliminating dedicated hardware firewalls that produce SDN flows [26]. This 
study will then utilize firewall anomaly discovery algorithm research [27] to produce a 
viable solution to moving our ports and not violating our firewall rules. Building upon 
this research we have all the tools to detect our change but then require programming 
constraints to add our decisions to the firewall policy and make complex queries to it 
[24].  
Conclusion 
The literature reviewed in this paper seems to be missing a reoccurring theme. 
This may be in due to the infant nature of SDN. However, this study’s use of flow tables 
[31] and concepts behind running our SDN [34] is supported by reoccurring research and 
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is well documented. The study does, however, require the most updated form of 
OpenFlow. “Switches using OpenFlow 1.0 forwarding model cannot perform more than 
one operation during the packet forwarding process [31].” Potentially proving paper 
prototype viable, our proposed structure tests a real-world environment with firewall rule 
omissions.  
Research and development environments are often scaled back and redundant. 
Production networks are expensive resulting in efficient network utilization being a 
repeated discussion. Expanding networks and additional complexities from the increased 
sized, creates problems for application developers. It has created need for sophisticated 
algorithmic control across this studies network [31]. New technologies are being 
proposed just to run parallel with SDN [33] or even using big data applications to run 
SDN itself [31] to in turn manage and run the network efficiently [33]. In the white paper 
SDN System Performance, we can see the pitfalls [37] of the hardware itself or 
optimization of the APIs [36]. Protocol utilization standards such as which fields are 
optional or required [38], and the overall complexity of the central logic controllers may 
hinder applicable solutions [35]. Last, this paper uses all combined research and 
constructs firewall models that simply call and use OpenFlow field standards [25] and 
proposed OpenFlow protocol configurations [26] In doing so this study creates the paper 
prototype presented for this thesis. Referring back to the ONF, on combining our 
hypothesis and pseudo code can easily be done by utilizing the SET-FIELD within 
OpenFlows field options [29]. Using proven implementations of other research and 
development projects we were able to produce a viable paper prototype. “We modify the 
controller to export an install route API to install a shadow-MAC-based label routed path 
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to a destination [30].” Installing this route API is the final stepping stone from identifying 
our rule violations, to implementing our detections in the violation, adding our new rule 
in and finally expanding the flow or path our traffic will take
13 
 
CHAPTER III 
SDN CURRENT IMPLEMENTATIONS 
In this chapter we focus on first understanding SDN architecture, its uses, 
proposed uses, current implementations and many of the various ways it is utilized. We 
assume that the reader has a background of basic networking experience. 
Why Was SDN Proposed? 
Computers communicating over a mesh of networks throughout the entire globe 
are a reality that was thought fantasy when the first network design was conceptualized. 
Conventional networks are hierarchical in structure, built with tiers of Ethernet switches 
arranged in a tree formation [4]. This design was best used when client-server computing 
was dominant initially during the first public computer network adoption [4]. Static 
architecture is ill suited to the dynamic computing and storage needs of today’s enterprise 
servers, data centers and mirrored backups, campuses, and carrier environments [4].  
Key Factors for Proposing SDN 
Users are the ultimate goal for any information technology project. Several trends 
in networking provide the impetus for the development of SDN technologies including 
(1) dynamic network traffic patterns; (2) mobilization; (3) security and controls; (4)large 
bandwidth applications;...  These also provide a foundation for understanding the need 
the proposed SDN Firewall solution presented in this paper. 
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Dynamic Network Traffic Patterns 
The model of communications from client to the server and back are long gone 
with applications communicating with applications and cloud services communicating 
with other virtual machine environments. The traffic is no longer hierarchical, which 
slows down current network infrastructures based on switches and routers.  In the 
Andromeda project Google’s core SDN were benchmarked on throughput and speed 
using netperf TCP_STREAM [43]. The results showed an approximate 300% increase in 
performance that shows the direct benefits from an SDN implementation.  
Mobilization 
The same study of Google’s SDN network also showed the impact of 
mobilization on traffic patterns. By benchmarking the total number of TCP Streams they 
showed that traditional networks operate at 2 Gigabits per second throughput versus 3.5 
Gigabits per second [43]. Because of the increased throughput, SDN multiplied in a 
literal sense with the number of devices communicating on the same network. Streaming 
efficiency also increased with SDN. Two hundred streams were monitored on a 
traditional network, which performed at 1.5 Gigabits per second versus an increase in the 
Andromeda SDN to 5.1 Gigabits per second.   
Security and Controls 
Accessing a Fortune 50 companies documentation or office work files from a 
smartphone was not conceived when the first network topologies were designed. This 
equivalent scenario would be Thomas Edison predicting electrical networks to handle 
wind and solar power plants and the circuitry being able to handle those loads. Yet both 
of these scenarios are actively being played out today with information being accessed on 
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the go and new wind turbines being erected in several countries. The need for improved 
security is one motivation for organizations implementing SDN technologies due its 
logical and central control.  
Using SDN to implement security reform leaves data scientists from Clemson 
University and Arizona State University asking how to solve the security challenges that 
will pop up with new software defined networking proposals. “One of the fundamental 
challenges is to build robust firewalls for protecting OpenFlow-based networks where 
network states and traffic are frequently changed [5].” If network architects can build 
robust firewalls with SDN OpenFlow organizations can eliminate many conventional 
downtime errors.  
Voice, Television, and Big Data 
Skype, Netflix, and Hadoop are applications, services and companies well known 
in 2015. Bandwidth and latency concerns continue to climb as services like Netflix begin 
to aggregate large amounts of traffic. Big Data applications such as Hadoop are also 
bandwidth intensive and have spawned numerous projects involving the need for SDN.  
Network engineers at Sigcomm propose not only using SDN, but using it with unique 
SDN topologies:  
These three trends taken together – software-defined networking, 
dynamically reconfigurable optical circuits, and structured big data 
applications – motivate us to explore the design of an SDN controller 
using a “cross-layer” approach that configures the network based on big 
data application dynamics at run-time [6].  
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Policies, Scalability, and Usability 
To implement a network-wide policy, IT may have to configure thousands of 
devices in a large organization, from client based personal computers, to routers, switches 
and servers. For example, every time a new virtual machine is brought up, it can take 
hours, in some cases days, for IT to reconfigure ACLs across the entire network [4].” The 
problem of building a robust firewall also falls into implementing network wide policies. 
The process of a new virtual machine being brought up is a core component of this papers 
problem. Dynamic policies create issues when an application is moved and begins to drop 
legitimate traffic. When moving a virtual server the firewall policy should be elastic 
enough to either reject the change or allow it to ensure legitimate traffic is not dropped. 
This is the critical need for SDN in current legacy organizations that explored in this 
paper.  
SDN Architecture 
To begin understanding SDN architecture the basic premise of networking first 
must be understood. The primary network stack includes switches and routers that 
network administrators utilize.   In SDN the control plane forwards traffic to the selected 
destination.  The data plane (sometimes called the forwarding plane), are contained 
within the hardware of switches and visible in firmware.  The data plane, however, is 
limited in manipulability by administrators. Since the data plane is decoupled from the 
control plane in SDN, we need a communication medium to coordinate the two, which is 
OpenFlow [3]. These planes build tables on the switches and routers; then sift through 
designating traffic from Point A to B or C. Traditional networking has all planes 
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implemented in the firmware of routers and switches which may be unique but conform 
to IEEE standards. 
Understanding the data plane and control planes we then can progress to SDN 
architecture, which utilizes the same concepts but through abstraction. “This architecture 
decouples the network control and forwarding functions enabling the network control to 
become directly programmable and the underlying infrastructure to be abstracted for 
applications and network services [7].”  
In Figure 3, we can see how the SDN architecture uses the “OpenFlow” protocol. 
This protocol is essential in using SDN and is a standard. The protocol is a standard 
endorsed by ONF for SDN. Babara Liskov is often quoted when reviewing SDN 
architecture “Modularity based on abstraction is the way things get done.” Figure 3 
shows the switch hardware forwarding traffic being controlled by the control layer. The 
control layer in turn is being accessed through an application layer, which communicates 
what traffic it has available and needs moved. 
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Figure 1. Software Defined Networking Architecture Abstract  
By decoupling the network control and forwarding functions, we can then begin 
to program our network directly.  Direct control over the network gives way to two major 
key points. First, our network is now dynamically moving and adjustable  giving the 
network agility and verbose with network engineers being able to configure, manage and 
even secure the network manually or even automatically with programs that they can 
write themselves due to non-proprietary firmware or software. Secondly, we may even 
move to integrating application developers into the network realm or vice versa. The 
doors to programming the network are blown wide open by allowing developers to have 
access to program the network to the specific needs of their application.  
Decimating through this information we have gathered that the OpenFlow 
protocol allows for the standard communications within the SDN architecture, the 
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decoupling of the planes allowing programmability, direct control over our network, its 
agility and potential for automation. Lastly, the most critical part of SDN architecture is 
the centrally managed portion. Similar in networking when speaking physically and 
logically with Ethernet traffic, we do the same with SDN. “Network intelligence is 
(logically) centralized in software-based SDN controllers that maintain a global view of 
the network, which appears to applications and policy engines as a single, logical switch 
[7].” Managing this “logical” centralized instance leads us to the (SDN) controllers. 
SDN Controllers 
SDN shifts the architecture as previously mentioned into a logical centralized 
instance. Coming with this instance leads to the need of a controller of sorts. The 
controller or main CPU processing unit of the entire network is a control point. “It is the 
strategic control point in the SDN network, relaying information to the switches/routers 
‘below’ (via southbound APIs) and the applications and business logic ‘above’ (via 
northbound APIs) [8].” The southbound APIs are application logic that dictates it’s needs 
top down from the application layer to the control layer. In vis-à-vis the turn of the traffic 
and decisions are being communicated back to the application layer. This controller 
would use common interface OpenFlow and presents another common protocol open 
virtual switch database (OVSDB). 
The controller is like a modular plugin platform, which then runs our network 
performing various tasks such as routing, balances, inventorying, and statistics. Even 
though the controller is performing basic tasks, it can be extensible and made to perform 
advanced tasks such as running custom code or algorithms citing new rules throughout 
the network and conducting on the fly analytics. This is the feature we are interested in 
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with solving our problem with an SDN perspective because citing new rules or 
implementing our own custom algorithm is what will make our solution a viable one. 
“The first SDN Controller was NOX, which was initially developed by Nicira Neworks, 
alongside OpenFlow. In 2008, Nicira Networks (acquired by VMWare) donated NOX to 
the SDN community (it was open sourced), where it has become the basis for many 
subsequent SDN Controller solutions [8].” Basic operations of a NOX SDN controller are 
displayed in Appendix A.    
Concluding on the SDN controller, a major proponent of SDN open source 
studies is not only the ONF but also the OpenDaylight project, which is part of the Linux 
Foundation. This SDN controller runs in a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) supporting both 
OpenFlow and the previously mentioned southbound API’s. Different types of SDN 
controllers exist in the ecosystem. NOX is a C++ multi-threaded controller that is written 
on top of a POX library, single threaded python controller, Beacon is another Java based 
controller [8], and many more variations. Each type of controller has its strengths and 
weaknesses; however, the first open source SDN controller was NOX. Along with 
various types of controllers, we can identify weak points of the SDN controllers and all 
their different versions. The larger the network the more taxing it will be on a centralized 
instance possibly even bringing the entire network down if the controller is corrupted, 
overloaded or simply under resourced or poorly optimized. A lightweight python based 
controller couldn’t handle the load to a certain critical point. The need for multiple 
controllers is then present. 
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SDNi 
In 2011, there was a technology news publication from the IEEE society 
approaching a solution to managing multiple SDN controllers. Providing an interface 
protocol between the controllers allows engineers to create an "interfacing SDN Domain 
Controllers [9]” referred to as SDNi, which was progressively being developed by the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). This allows for the scalable environment that we 
can operate in larger organizations by deploying multiple SDN controllers. In Figure 2 
SDNi Overview we can see how the switches and OpenFlow protocol fits within this 
SDNi environment. This environment shown below is a horizontal SDNi structure. Each 
switch is paired and communicating with each other on decisions being made. A single 
controller could be added on top of this diagram turning it into a single controller 
dedicated to controller all sub controllers, which is a vertical SDNi approach.  
 
Figure 2. SDNi Overview 
SDNi allows the SDN controllers to communicate various information details 
such as “network topology, network events, user defined request information, Quality of 
Service (QoS) requirements from user application request, integration infrastructure 
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status, and more [10].” SDN controller communications as explained previously can have 
horizontal and vertical designs. These designs arrived due to having one controller may 
not be suitable to cover the entire network. SDNi, in turn, solves this. Further 
understanding the in depth nature of SDN we must look at three more elements that 
compromise it overall. The OpenFlow enabled switches displayed above in Figure 2, 
OpenFlow Protocol itself, and Flow Tables.  “An SDN controller communicates with 
OpenFlow compatible switches using the OpenFlow protocol running over the Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL) [11].” Analyzing these switches and routers we can see how SDN 
and the protocols work by decoupling the planes within the hardware.  
OpenFlow Protocol and Switches 
As previously mentioned in SDN Controllers section we discussed that OpenFlow 
is not the only protocol on the rise in development and use, but it is one of the most 
widely utilized and researched currently. OpenFlow provides the standards for the 
interface on controlling the data packets. This is the main goal of the ONF foundation is 
to set global standards and interoperability in place. “The OpenFlow standard also 
provides a basic set of global management abstractions, which can be used to control 
features such as topology changes and packet filtering [12].” Breaking down an 
OpenFlow enabled switch we can segregate it into three distinct parts, the flow table, 
secure channel, and the OpenFlow Protocol. In Figure 3 OpenFlow Switch shows how 
these three distinct parts reside within our OpenFlow enabled switch.  
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Figure 3. OpenFlow Switch [25] 
First we can see the “Flow Table - Tells the switch how to process each data flow 
by associating an action with each flow table entry [12].” The Flow Table will be 
populated with entries via allowance the OpenFlow protocol defined by a server external 
to the switch. By populating this flow table we can have various entries and dictations 
through policies that are enabled by secure channel. This flow table and secure channel is 
where the basis of our experiment will begin.  
Utilizing certain fields and actions within the flow tables we can dictate our own 
programmability of the network. “Secure Channel - Connects the switch to a remote 
control processor (called the Controller) so commands and packets can be sent between 
the controller and the switch [12].” This is the programmability and modularity that is 
often discussed when SDN is proposed. Not only can we develop specific firewall rules 
or policies there are numerous activities that can be done with this programmability such 
as time sensitive express lanes or even a new type of Quality of Service (QoS). The last 
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part of the switch is the OpenFlow protocol, which we have covered is a standardized 
interface for the controller to the switch. Below in Table 1 we can see the reserved ports 
provided by the ONF and suggested optional ports as well.  
Table 1. OpenFlow Ports 
Port Name Description 
Required / 
Optional 
ALL 
This is for all ports the switch may potentially use for forwarding a packet. 
Is an egress port only. Required 
CONTROLLER 
Representative of the channel that controls with the SDN 
controller. Can be an ingress and egress port. 
Required 
TABLE 
Beginning of OpenFlow pipeline. Valid as an output action in the 
action list of a packet-out message. 
Required 
IN_PORT Packet ingress port, can only be used as packet output port.  Required 
ANY 
Specialized value in certain OpenFlow syntax when no port is 
called. A wild card value which we will be using for our firewall 
complexities.  
Required 
LOCAL 
Switches local networking stack and the management stack 
associated with it. Both an incoming and outgoing port it enables 
remote entities to interact with the switch via the OpenFlow 
network. 
Optional 
 
Flow Tables 
Each switch maintains an OpenFlow pipline, a virtual pipeline, which maintains 
the multiple flow tables which therein contain multiple flow entries. This is how the 
packets interact with the tables. The switch must have at least one table for it to be active. 
“Each flow table entry has a specific action associated with a particular flow, such as 
forwarding the flow to a given switch port (at line rate), encapsulating and forwarding the 
flow to a controller for processing, or dropping a flow’s packets (for example, to help 
prevent denial of service attacks) [12].”  
A very basic way of how the Flow Table or groups of Flow Tables methodology 
and mechanics work is with how they handle a short process of finding the highest 
priority matching flow entry. Then it will apply instructions based off the matches. Those 
instructions could be to modify the packet and update the match fields, update action set. 
The update action set is what we will be using in our effort to produce a viable algorithm 
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to reduce our firewall complexity, which will be referenced later as our set-field when 
discussing the OpenFlow port.  
The Update actions are set clear actions or write action instructions. One can 
begin to formulate our methodology and process for achieving a certain set of algorithmic 
functions to avoid moving our application into a restrictive environment eventually 
crashing it by seeing this port and OpenFlow standard. It may also update metadata 
within step two. Lastly, we will send match data and the actions set to the next table and 
this denotes the processing pipeline.  
Below in Table 2. Flow Table Components we can see the main component 
entries provided by the ONF in a Flow Table. 
Table 2. Flow Table Components [13] 
Match Fields Priority Counters Instructions Timeouts Cookie 
 
Further specifications on the Flow Table will be included in the Appendix A. 
SDN Vulnerabilities 
Like any new technology, vulnerabilities and risks are often associated with new 
changes. Simply reviewing our architecture explanations we can quickly identify that a 
central point such as the SDN controller would be an exceptional point of attack. An 
attacker is able to compromise the controller than he is able to compromise the network 
and propagate through it rapidly. “According to Ramnath Venugopalan of Intel Security 
(formerly McAfee), SDN opens potential security holes, especially in connections 
between controllers and network elements [14].” The controllers and switches are no 
exception to traditional attacks either. Depending on which language the controller is 
written in depends on the vulnerabilities associated with it, compounding on top of the 
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risks are introductions of new risks by the flow tables and OpenFlow protocol 
misconfigurations.  
Physical risks include overloading the controller as previously mentioned, which 
will bring down the entire network not just parts. If the demands or traffic for the network 
is too large the controller may fail, dropping legitimate traffic or slowing the service to an 
unacceptable level. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, we have discussed aspects to why SDN was proposed, the 
architecture behind SDN and our focus within the technologies. Progressing forward we 
can take away key points such as one of the proposals for SDN was Security and Policy 
based decision making which aligns to this studies proposed problem of decision making 
for changing our application from HTTP to HTTPS. Not only is this proposal a widely 
regarded one, it is the proposal we will be focusing on.  
Trying to implement a robust firewall design is complicated; however once done 
successfully our hypothesis of it reducing the complexity of our firewall environment will 
prove beneficial in new ways that were unrealized. The SDN architecture summed up is a 
central logical location versus how switches use to see when the data packet arrived at the 
switch, and then the firmware would send it off to the destination with its rules built in. 
Network engineers had no control over these rules and that is what SDN is enabling. 
“"On a network running OpenFlow, computer scientists can add to, subtract from, and 
otherwise meddle with these rules [3].” 
The rules that we will be meddling with are located within the SDN controller and 
switches. The OpenFlow protocol and flow tables are what will allow us to change our 
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landscape and fulfill the solution to our problem.  Moving an application server when 
doing a patch or adding a port can break the entire application. If we were able to 
somehow have the programmability of a network at our fingertips we could prevent this. 
This problem is widely recognized within the SDN community; however, it is slightly 
different then the thesis problem of updating an entire traditional environment over to an 
SDN environment to solve development problems. This thesis will achieve this by diving 
into the SDN architecture, down to the controllers, down to the switch, and into the flow 
tables themselves. Once this project has proposed the solution it will traverse back up to 
the controller level and have the SDNi level roll out this projects proposal.  
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CHAPTER IV 
FIREWALL ARCHITECTURE 
Discussing firewall architecture this thesis will focus on select items including 
how traditional firewalls work briefly, current real world implementations that are 
anonymous due to the sensitive nature of firewall architecture, following in parallel of 
anonymous data current security practices, policies, and standards and closing with 
firewall implementation options with SDN.  
Firewalls essentially have a narrow job list which includes closing off ports, 
applying certain routing rules to packets and preventing large attacks on the network. 
They also prevent large illegitimate traffic from getting out if there is a compromise 
within the network. “Traditional firewalls can also be expensive to operate, especially if 
you need to supplement them with additional security technologies [15].” Firewalls are 
not only expensive to operate, but the overall costs are often not efficiently recorded as 
well.  
Overall costs are referencing bureaucracy in developing alongside firewall teams 
such as the time it would take to request a firewall change. In smaller environments one 
or two individuals usually do the changes; however, working with large organizations 
and application developer may have to wait an unacceptable amount of time until he or 
she gets the desired firewall change. Not only does this study utilize technology to reduce 
risk and complexity, it also should eliminate unnecessary red tape bureaucracy and 
allowing organizations to move with agility and ease.  
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Progressing forward we will discuss how current firewalls are being used, phased 
out and how we can use SDN to our advantage solving the problem listed above. 
Firewalls can be grouped into traditional, distributed, embedded and others. Our 
hypothesis we will focus on distributed firewalls and how they create certain risk 
domains within an organization.  
Abstract Firewall Architecture 
Starting off with firewall architecture we can examine Figure 4. Single Firewall 
Abstract. 
Internet
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Switch
Client
Legitimate
Traffic
Illegitimate
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Illegitimate
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Figure 4. Single Firewall Abstract 
Above we can see how the client has legitimate traffic that is traversing usually 
through a switch or a router then hits our single firewall then communicates to the 
Internet. This border firewall will be combined into our Flow Table in SDN. Therefore 
the complex decision making logic will reside within the field settings of our SDN and 
not a traditional tree based access control language border firewall. Even at the level of 
users with home networks they still have software firewalls behind the border hardware 
firewall at the router or switch level.  
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This divides the firewalls into two types of categories, hardware firewalls and 
software firewalls. In Figure 4, we are displaying a hardware firewall. “Hardware 
firewalls are normally situated between the network and the connecting cable/modem. 
These are external hardware devices usually called Network firewalls [16].” Finding the 
solution to our problem, we see in SDN how traditional hardware or network firewalls 
are converted over to a software firewall while still maintaining its status as a hardware 
firewall.  
The programmability of an SDN allows for us to make an elastic robust firewall 
for communicating traffic across our network. “Software firewalls are basically software 
components that are internal to the computer system. They work hand-in-hand with the 
computer’s operating system [16].” Working with the computers operating system 
software firewalls are designed to protect the client they reside on. Using the single focus 
and expanding it throughout our SDN by programming our flow tables will provide a 
unique firewall solution. 
Types of Firewalls 
 Firewalls were one of the first inventions of security when the Internet was 
brought into existence. The Internet grew and along with it so did the types of firewalls. 
Cautiously proceeding, material referenced in 1999 is still relevant today, hinting the 
need for new technologies on protecting our networks.  
Packet Filtering 
“Filtering firewalls screen packets based on addresses and packet options. They 
operate at the IP packet level and make security decisions (really, "to forward, or not to 
forward this packet, that is the question") based on the headers of the packets [17].” 
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Packet filtering takes place at the third layer of the OSI model of networking. At the IP 
Internet Protocol (IP) Layer we can afford to have a robust implementation because this 
is present in nearly every device on the network such as routers, switches, wireless points 
and much more.  
Expanding upon Figure 4 we can see in Figure 5 Filtering, how the firewall 
examines characteristics of the packet and then matches them to an accept policy rule or 
reject. If a match is not found typically the firewall will refer to its own Quality of 
Service policy. In exploring our options for certain firewalls we have three distinct 
groups. In Figure 5 the packet characteristics are source Internet protocol (IP) address, 
source port, destination IP address, and destination port. Filling the last spot is the IP 
Protocol, which could be Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP). The figures begin to dive deeper into the SDN framework for the study’s 
proposal. Figure 5 shows the standard filtering logic that will have to be dynamically 
applied inside the SDN proposal. The same permit and deny logic will not be simple and 
concise within the SDN switch. Taking into account numerous types of filtering the 
proposal begins to become complex. 
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Figure 5. Filtering 
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Packet filtering can then be divided into three more subsections listed below. 
Table 3. Packet Filtering Subtypes 
Packet Filtering Subtypes 
Stateful Inspection 
Similar to dynamic packet filtering adding 
on the granular inspection of data contained 
within the IP Packet. This gives the 
Firewall the ability to see what is in the 
packet, which may prove useful when 
implementing our SDN.  
  
Dynamic Filtering 
“Dynamic packet filtering tracks the 
outgoing packets it has allowed to pass and 
allows only the corresponding response 
packets to return. When the first packet is 
transmitted to the public network 
(Internet), a reverse filter is dynamically 
created to allow the response packet to 
return. To be counted as a response, the 
incoming packet must be from the host and 
port to which the outbound packet was 
sent.” [18] 
  
Static Filtering 
Most common type of filtering, displayed 
in Figure 5. This filtering must be manually 
changed. 
 
Application – Gateway Firewalls 
Gateway firewalls, like packet filtering, determine whether or not a connection 
will be made through it also determines how each connection should be made. This 
information is crucial for building the study proposal. The gateway firewalls logic is the 
closest firewall rule logic that will apply to the thesis proposal. “This type of firewall 
stops each incoming (or outgoing) connection at the firewall, and, if the connection is 
permitted, initiates its connection to the destination host on behalf of whoever created the 
initial connection. This type of connection is called a proxy connection [18].” In short 
34 
 
this process should be transparent to the user and is acting merely like a simple proxy 
server that provides to specific applications. This type of firewall is what closely aligns to 
our SDN hypothesis. “By using its database, which defines the types of connections 
allowed, the firewall either establishes another connection (i.e., permitting the originating 
and destination host to communicate) or drops the original connection [18].” This type of 
firewall ensures protocol conformance and can even inspect individual sessions and 
decide to drop packets based on information in the headers or payloads.  
Circuit Level – Gateway Firewalls 
Combining gateway firewalls to the study proposal circuit level gateway firewalls 
will contribute to the proposal. These firewalls operate at the session layer of the OSI 
Model. “They monitor TCP handshaking between the packets to determine if a requested 
session is legitimate [19].” Network Address Translation or NAT is a large part of circuit 
level gateway firewalls. This part of the firewall will allow for a public IP address at the 
firewall level and internal private IP address therefore traffic being routed and possibly 
remote controlled into the environment is not exposed to potential intruders. 
With the three types of firewall architectures explained there are stateful 
multilayer inspection firewalls which combine the aspects of all the other types of 
firewalls and filter packets amongst the transport layers, network layers and application 
layers. The firewalls could allow packets to pass through individuals, direction 
connections or the algorithms they choose to recognize at the application layer instead of 
specific rules.  
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Multiple Firewall Environments 
After discussing the different types of firewalls and how their overall architecture 
and how our SDN is implemented, we begin to turn towards the crux of our problem. 
Multiple firewall environments are present in nearly every large organization and 
corporate network. Corporate firewalls are usually separated out into multiple risk 
domains. For example the company’s intranet would have a firewall separating it 
between a low risk domains then another firewall separating the low risk domain with a 
high risk domain which is usually outward facing towards the internet.  
On top of these risk domains we would have separate instances of local firewalls 
for different uses and applications. “The consistency between those firewall policies is 
crucial to corporate network security. However, the managing of these has become a 
complex and error-prone task. Bad configurations may cause serious security breaches 
and network vulnerabilities. In particular, conflicting filtering rules lead to block 
legitimate traffic or to accept unwanted packets [20].”  
Understanding the complexity of these problems we need to thoroughly review a 
proposed abstract environment. The environment in Figure 6, which we have named 
Firewall Risk Domain Problem, is based off a real world model provided by a large 
American Fortune 500 firm.
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 Figure 6. Firewall Risk Domain Problem 
Abstracting this real world setup we will focus on using this firewall architecture 
as the basis for our research problem. First, we must understand the flow of data within 
our network and firewalls before addressing the problems it presents. 
In Figure 6, we have five environments starting at the lowest level in which we 
first see a local environment. A good example for a local environment would be a facility 
or offices that are offsite from a headquarters of an enterprise or organization. This local 
facility has chosen to be behind a local firewall for purposes that align with their policies 
and usually contains computers, servers of their own, printers and other devices operating 
on the network.  
The traffic moves from the local environment to the load balancer via a web port 
and also a rogue user outside the firewall. This user is shown because even though the 
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firewall is in place a user may find a way to be accessing the intranet load balancer not 
through their firewall. Firewall configuration errors could lead to major attacks; 
misconfiguration could lead to applications being reduced all traffic being dropped; or 
entire domains could be restricted or error prone. “One challenge is that large networks 
usually have several firewalls scattered across the network each with their own firewall 
policy. This makes designing and deploying an effective firewall policy difficult [20].”  
 
Figure 7. Close Up Intranet 
In a more detailed view in Figure 7 we can see we have the corporate intranet 
shared with a load balancer and two shared webservers. The load balancer could be a 
cisco blade or any other commercial load balancer along with the web servers being java 
virtual machines or even windows web servers running Internet Information Services 
(IIS). A special note to take in is the service from one shared application server is 
showcasing traffic with an application-to-application call. In a real world example when 
changing over the HTTP to HTTPS we change the ports from 80 to 443. “Therefore, 
unawareness of policy conflicts and errors can significantly increase the risk of policy 
inconsistency thus increasing network vulnerability [21].”   
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Not knowing the app-to-app call which is very easy to do could cause a network 
vulnerability or error if the application developer did not know this was implemented. 
This would be an easy miss for consultant developers who inherit completed systems and 
begin working on them for the first time with organizations who have had the 
applications in maturity or retirement age. “An error in a firewall policy can be a wrong 
definition of being legitimate or illegitimate for some packets. This can lead to a firewall 
either accepting some malicious packets, which consequently creating security holes in 
the firewall, or discard some legitimate packets, which consequently disrupt normal 
business [22][23].”  
This problems complexity would be further compounded if we considered both 
Wide Area Networks (WAN) and Local Area Networks (LAN). For simplicity we will be 
assuming everything is residing on a Local Area Network. However, we will take into 
account how complex the actual rules for the firewall are. These can be so complex that 
Avishai Wool dedicated his entire paper for developing a quantitative analysis for 
firewall rule complexity: “RC = Rules + Objects + Interfaces(Interfaces -1)/2, where RC 
denotes rule complexity, Rules denotes the raw number of rules in the rule set, Objects 
denotes the number of network objects, and Interfaces denotes the number of interfaces 
on the Firewall [23].” Not even getting out of the intranet environment we can begin to 
see the complexity of the environment.  
Progressing upward we will pass through another firewall separating out intranet 
and our low risk domain. The traffic going from our web servers in the intranet and the 
application servers in the low risk domain are bidirectional web service calls. This is an 
important distinction due to our policies on the firewall separating out these two 
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environments. Within the low risk domain we have three shared application servers 
running various applications within their environments.  
Last we have the high-risk domain with one-way traffic coming into the low risk 
domain separated by our last firewall. Within the high-risk domain we have two web 
servers and a load balancer. A great example for this environment would be of a user 
trying to use the same application within the intranet or low risk domain but is currently 
off campus and travelling mobile. Therefore the user would be high risk because they are 
coming from our last environment the Internet.  
Analyzing and trying to resolve this complex environment is a fairly traditional 
problem since the inception of the Internet. Expert systems have been developed and in 
use for a long time and they generally work by using a database with an engine to make 
sure there is uniform policy and decisions being made. “This goal is usually achieved by 
combining a logical inference engine with a knowledge base. The information in the 
knowledge base contains a set of known facts and a set of production rules that allow if-
then inferences on the facts and other acquired information [24].” The critical point of 
expert systems is there is not a defined way in our previous example to prevent an 
application developer changing the HTTP to HTTPS and breaking the entire application 
because of an unknown policy. The expert system is not interested what the application is 
doing only if it meets the firewalls requirements.
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Table 4. Example of Firewall Rules 
Protocol Source IP Port 
Destination 
IP 
Port Action 
UDP 192.168.10.1 80,001 10.1.1.12 80,100 Deny 
TCP DMZ 443 Any Any Allow 
 
The policy matrix could be a table format or simply algorithm saying the example 
of a destination for this packet is the Internet and the source is DMZ which is allowed on 
certain ports like 80 and 443 but on intranet is allowed for all ports. Instead of merely 
throwing away legitimate traffic which an expert system would do if we changed our 
HTTP to HTTPS SDN will allow us to be robust enough to save the application 
developer from crippling the system with an outage. 
Conclusion 
The complexity of multiple firewall organizations like the one described above 
proves to be a problem that is pressing for traditional networks. Reviewing the original 
architecture of one firewall and one entry and exit point we noted that the basic premise 
of firewall is to allow or deny traffic. We defined the difference between a hardware 
firewall which is usually a network firewall sitting on a router or between the hardware 
servers.  
Software firewalls we analyzed are specifically designed for the client they are 
residing on such as a windows computer. We analyzed how the firewalls operated with 
the three different types including filtering with subsets of static filtering, dynamic 
filtering and stateful inspection. Adopting the stateful inspection methodology we will 
push forward towards our SDN solution combining it with our second firewall type 
application gateway firewalls.  
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These modular and programmable options push us in the direction of controlling 
the network to a level where we can fix our exuberant problem of firewall miss 
configuration along the lines with application developers. Last type of firewall we 
discussed was circuit level gateways, which utilize the network address translation area. 
Using this critical information we then thoroughly analyzed our real world problem being 
presented in Figure 6. Examining the risk domains and how the organization is setup we 
must provide a solution to where if we move an application server, web server, or simply 
change or HTTP protocol to HTTPS it does not crash our system due to unknown 
firewall policy and rule. “In this case, the filtering rules and VLANs need to be well 
defined such that no desired traffic is blocked before reaching its destination and no 
undesired traffic is allowed to flow through the various firewalls in the distributive 
environment [20].” Publications only a few years old are proposing future work for this 
very problem however they are using expert systems with traditional network topologies 
to try and solve it. Instead we are proposing to upgrade the traditional network to a 
software-defined network which potentially solves our problem and provides more 
benefits than originally intended that is discussed in our analysis chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
SDN REDUCING COMPLEX ARCHITECTURES 
In Chapter 4 we have reviewed basic firewall architectures and a solid foundation 
of our real world problem moving protocols or traffic amongst different risk domains, 
firewalls, and policies. Chapter 5 will focus solely on defining how we will achieve 
upgrading our traditional or legacy network example into an SDN network. Continuing 
forward we will propose how the SDN will handle HTTP being switched to HTTPS and 
prevent application developers from bringing an application down due to unknown rules 
and firewalls. “Researchers can control their own flows - by choosing the routes their 
packets follow and the processing they receive. In this way, researchers can try new 
routing protocols, security models, addressing schemes, and even alternatives to IP [25].” 
With Figure 6 being our proposed problem topology, Figure 4 will be our proposed 
solution topology. 
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SDN Topology Upgrade 
We begin with an analysis to understand how the traditional environment has 
been converted into a hypothetical SDN environment in Figure 7.
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Figure 8. SDN Topology Upgrade 
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Using Figure 7 and others we will show how to solve the problem of migration 
and benefitting the developers when we preserve the nodes reachability. All firewalls in 
this Figure 7 have been absorbed by the OpenFlow switches. “SDN switching equipment 
supports flow routing tables (Flow Tables) in which processing rules for packet flows are 
installed. The final step of migration from a traditional topology to an SDN paradigm is 
installing flow rules into OF switches flow tables [26].”  
Comparing to Figure 6 we can see all the firewalls have been aggregated into 
Flow Rules, which will be explained further on. This topology shows that we have added 
two SDN controllers to the original environment, removed two of the load balancers 
because the SDN switches act as load balancers with the flow of traffic controlled, and 
added the four SDN switches themselves. Noted on the graph we can see the forwarding 
planes denoted between each of the switches.  
Coming from the SDN controller we can see the control plane being used within 
the secure channel that was shown in Figure 3. How the provisioning of firewall policies 
and sub policies within we can think of each risk domain (intranet, low risk, high risk) as 
a subnet or vice versa. The overall topology of the network such as lattice, star, ring, 
graph, dimensional cube, etc. is not taken into account for this working example. Our 
only focus is this small slice of the overall real world example and does not include the 
rest of our network that would be interlaced with extra switches, servers, controllers and 
clients. We are merely showing that a problem such as HTTP converting over to HTTPS 
would not bring the entire network down with our solution. All the servers listed on the 
figure are Virtual Machines (VM), which means they can be easily moved from one 
domain to another, can have policies changed within the server or simply moved to a 
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different IP address. In traditional environments the movement of servers is not chaotic; 
most changes will be done via the application development side of our problem. We now 
have a clear understanding of how our environment would look with our topology 
displayed and explained. 
Flow Tables and Rules 
Focusing on the firewall rule policies themselves we will not list out all rules and 
matches. Great example of rule policy logic that we can convert into the flow table below 
is from Modeling and Management of Firewall Policies [26].  
In their paper, they provide five definitions for policy rule logic. Definition One 
aligns to the proposal of disjoint fields which are in turn if the server was looking for IP 
A to IP B it does not equal the corresponding flow within the SDN table. Definition Two 
provides the complex logic of meeting the flow table match. Definition Three would be 
in where the decision and advanced querying within SDN would be vital. The rule 
dictates if IP A is not matching our flow table but has a partial match communicating to 
another SDN controller for inclusive matching then IP A has changed while IP B or the 
superset IP has remained the same. This is applicable to our proposed problem 
specifically of moving IP A or Port 80 to HTTPS on Port 443. Definition Four would be 
rule logic for checking our SDN proposal all the way end to end to see if the firewall flow 
has been broken in another risk domain. Definition Five builds the firewall flow outward 
towards the ending destination. If rules one through four have been a match, the SDN 
must begin to build the flow creating an end-to-end flow by correlating with previous 
flows in place. All detailed formulas can be found in Table 5.1.
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Table 5. Policy Rule Logic [26] [27] 
Definition 
Number 
Description 
Definition 
1 
 
Definition 
2 
 
Definition 
3 
 
Definition 
4 
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Definition 
5 
 
With the programmability offered by SDN an organization can slowly create 
small trial environments to see how they might affects their overall network and 
production environments. Creating more and more of these pocket environments will 
eventually lead to the overall network being converted into a software defined network 
instead of a traditional.  
Many different versions of pseudo code have been presented traditional firewall 
policy research. For example, “If filtering rules on two different routes between subnets 
are different, i.e. if an end point on one route is reachable and on the other is not, the 
warning message “Conflict Found” is displayed and computation stops” is example 
pseudocode from Bob, et al. [26], which has a similar goal to this study. However, what 
most papers fail to identify is the pseudo code and process by which we should be using 
our rules.  
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Pseudo Code Logic Proposal 
BOOLEAN Change Application Network (Application){ 
 IF (App.HasChanged) AND {FlowPolicy.Firewall = 
FlowPolicyAcceptance 
  Then  
   Controller.UpdateFlowPolicy  
   Controller.SwitchFlowTableUpdate 
   RETURN TRUE; 
 ELSE IF FlowPolicy.Firewall != FlowPolicyAcceptance  
  THEN  
   App.FirewallHybrid 
   Controller.UpdateFlowPolicy 
   Controller.SwitchFlowTableUpdate 
   RETURN TRUE; 
 ELSE  
  Controller.DoNotUpdateFlowPolicy 
  Controller.SwitchFlowTableUnchanged 
  RETURN FALSE; 
 
Mathematical Proof Pseudo Code 
 
𝑓(𝐴𝑝𝑝1): 𝑆𝐶1∆(𝑁1 ∨ 𝐹1) → 𝑓(𝑃𝐶𝑌): 𝑆𝐶1 ∩ 𝐹1 = 𝑃𝐴 → 𝑆𝐶1∆(𝑆𝑊1 ∧ 𝐹1) ~ 𝑃𝐶𝑌
= 𝑃𝑅 → 𝑆𝐶1(𝑆𝑊1 ∧ 𝐹𝑥𝑁) = (𝑃𝐴 ∧  ∆𝑆𝐶1)   ~ 𝑆𝐶1 ∩ 𝑄𝑜𝑆 
→ 𝑆𝐶1(𝑆𝑊1 ∧ 𝐹2)   
Above in our pseudo code proposal, this study proposes an application created 
and running Java or C++ on the controller. This application checks for the change in state 
of the applications currently listed in the controller and communicating on its network. 
The network is defined as the domains previously discussed with intranet, low risk 
domain and high risk domain. If an application listed on the controller presents a change 
as proposed in Figure 7, the proposed application of this study will follow this logic. 
First, the program has a Boolean if an application has changed in its listing and 
the change meets the flow rules and firewall rules in the form of flow policy acceptance 
on the network, it will update the controllers table and update the switches table which 
contain both the flow rules and combined firewall rules returning a true value. Else if, the 
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application plans to create a move that does not present a policy acceptance it will call the 
function App.FirewallHybrid that is outlined abstractly in Table 5 to create the proper 
flow rules updating the policy on the controller and the flow table on the switch. 
Last, if none of the criterion meet the designed specifications and terms of quality 
service it should return a false, not changing or updating the controllers flow and switch 
table, preventing the changed application flow to be interrupted and the application 
crashing. The Mathematical proof is an abstract of the pseudo code outlining similarly. 
Network 1
Firewall 1
A
P
P
L
I
C
A
T
I
O
N
Network 2
Movement
Firewall 2
Due to planned or 
unplanned movement, 
the application server is 
moved into a new 
tiered network and 
does not carry over the 
firewall policy
Network 2
Firewall Hybrid
Hot Fix Change
A hotfix change has to 
be implemented to 
correct application 
usability to users. This 
can cause many 
downtime hours.
Problem
Network 1
Firewall 1
A
P
P
L
I
C
A
T
I
O
N
Movement
Application team or 
shared environment 
owner submits the 
move to the SDN 
controller.
Network 2
Firewall Hybrid
Accepted Rule Propagation
Using Set-Field the SDN 
controller either adds in 
exception to the second 
firewall or rejects the 
move.
Solution
SDN Controller
Reject Policy Propagation
 
Figure 9. Flow Controller Logic 
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In Greg Ferro’s essay SDN Use Case: Firewall Migration in the Enterprise [28] 
he also proposes flow migrations with traditional networks. However, comparing to our 
research with Greg’s is proposing a logical step-by-step migration of each firewall. “Now 
you have forced the flow over to the alternate firewall while other flows continue to 
traverse the old firewall.” While this API has not been developed, it shows this study is 
not the only approach combining SDN and firewalls. Our method also proposes that 
application developers not migrate over single firewall rule policies, but upgrade pieces 
of the network with SDN all at once. 
How do Flows, Flow? 
With our top-level logic explained we will now briefly review how the OpenFlow 
Switch provides MAC forwarding and IP Forwarding. The example provided by the ONF 
is in Figure 7. 
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Flow Tables
Control 
Frame
Ingress VID
MAC 
Learning
ACL
L2
To Controller
ETH_DST
ETH_TYPE
IN_PORT
VLAN_VID
IN_PORT
VLAN_VID
ETH_SRC
Traffic Is 
Metered
VLAN_VID
ETH_DST
Protocol 
Filter
ETH_TYPE
ETH_DST
ARP
IPv4
IPv6
IPV4_DST
IPV6_DST
Group Tables
ARP / ND 
EXCEPTION
Next Hop 
Entries
L3ECMP 
Entries
Flood Entries
L2 Mcast 
Entries
Egress Port 
Entries
Select
INDIRECT 
FF (opt)
TTL 
Exception
ALL
INDIRECT
ALL
 
Figure 10. Flow Table Logic [29] 
This shows how the controller has the controlling characteristics based on the 
older version of the OpenFlow protocol. This is a common standard for bridging and 
forwarding so the descriptions and characteristics are well known. However, as noted in 
the figure the control frame has not been merged with access control lists table, the key 
feature we should take away from Figure 10. We can now add in matching rules to the 
flow table to automate our policies. Our architecture in Table 5 creates the topology 
shown below in Figure 11. 
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Simplified Flow 
Facility User
192.168.1.170
Host A
aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa
Switch 1
11:11
6 18
Match Action
Source IP = *
Source IP = 
192.168.1.50
Source IP = *
Source IP = 
192.168.1.170
Destination Mac = 
33:33
Forward to Port 18
Destination Mac = 
aa:aa
Forward To Port 6
Switch 2
22:22
7 29
Match Action
Source MAC = *
Destination MAC = 
33:33
Source MAC = *
Destination MAC = 
11:11
Forward To Port 29
Forward to Port 7
Switch 1 Flow Table Switch 2 Flow Table
Switch 1
11:11
8 21
Match Action
Source IP = *
Source IP = 
192.168.1.50
Source IP = *
Source IP = 
192.168.1.170
Destination Mac = 
bb:bb
Forward to Port 21
Destination Mac = 
11:11
Forward To Port 8
Switch 3 Flow Table
Ect
 
Figure 11. Flow Topology 
 Using Figure 11, we can see an example of how the MAC address is being issued 
by the SDN controller with our Firewall policies to complete an end-to-end flow. This 
end-to-end flow design is an example how we can achieve our goal with SDN and 
firewall rules being less complex. As Eric Rozner said, “The MAC address rewriting 
scheme leverages the fact that OpenFlow-compatible switches can rewrite addresses in 
the data plane at line rate [30].” This means we are able to drive that packet at line rate 
into a particular path with the rules we subject from the ingress port and the egress port. 
We can even begin to write rules corresponding to the hypervisor on the switches with 
the virtual hosts like our shared webservers and shared application servers as seen in 
Appendix A examples.
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CHAPTER VI 
DID IT WORK? 
Hearing the system is down after a patch is every developer’s worse nightmare in 
a production environment. The purpose of this thesis proposes a solution to this problem 
of complex and vague firewall policy environments by implementing SDN. Did we 
succeed at preventing a critical incident with the study prototype? The answer is, yes, 
theoretically, and inconclusive in a large organization.  
This thesis has proposed the pseudo code with the firewall programmable logic in 
Table 5, which should, in theory, produce solution similar to Figure 11 flow table. This 
flow table would then follow the general applicable steps provided in Figure 8 to properly 
route our HTTP to HTTPS while checking for rule violation and integrity along the way 
with Table 5 logic. Also for local firewall searches this study will use the local firewall 
search algorithm in Appendix A. We also show that we can program the flow tables to 
prevent the traffic from dropping with SDN the end-to-end logic flow. However, the 
number of flows that a switch can store is limited by the hardware itself. Another limiting 
factor is getting switches with OpenFlow 1.3 or later versions enabled on them. Vendor 
sentiment has been against creating an open environment because they would like to 
convert OpenFlow to their own proprietary platforms. “Standards have been a lively part 
of the SDN debate, but that discussion has been focused more on how forwarding is 
programmed into individual network devices.” [32] 
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SDN Extended 
We have started off explaining the top levels of SDN. We examined why SDN 
was originally proposed ranging from traffic patterns to our problem of security and 
controls. SDN will continue to evolve as the technology is still in its infancy and the 
needs are growing for it every day. It has spawned numerous other technologies and 
projects running in parallel infancy and growing such as Network Functions 
Virtualization (NFV). “Whereas NFV focuses on network platform virtualization, SDN is 
focused on network virtualization [33].” 
Our proposed solution today might be outdated tomorrow by functions served up 
in NFV. Gathering the updated and most recent data, the best conclusion is to participate 
with leading groups such as the ONF. “Leading standards groups like the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) is already devising ways to unify SDN 
and NFV monitoring data [34].” Expanding even further on the rapid pace of SDN 
concepts including NFV, this study started off in April, 2013. One year into writing this 
thesis the subject of running an SDN network efficiently came about.  
Understanding SDN and the proposal’s limitation understands that every 
connection in the network is a flow. On top of the flows we are adding firewall rule logic 
creating a firewall flow. This would mean thousands upon thousands of flow entries in a 
moderate to large network. We mentioned previously that the limitations of the hardware 
are one obstacle; however, even running the network that large itself would take a 
program equally if not greater in mass and complexity. “But exactly how will network 
management accomplish this feat? Curiously enough, the answer is Big Data [34].” As 
we mentioned in Chapter 3 a driving force for SDN was Big Data applications, however, 
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ironically it seems we need Big Data applications to run the network of Big Data 
applications.  
Explaining through the concepts of the SDN controller, we have noted several 
different types of controllers. While we didn’t select a specific controller for future 
research it should be noted NOX was the original OpenFlow controller.  “NOX is the 
original OpenFlow controller.  It serves as a network control platform that provides a 
high-level programmatic interface for management and the development of network 
control applications [35].” We covered how the application layer, the control layer and 
infrastructure layers role are fulfilled with the SDN architecture and eventually explored 
SDNi.  
In our SDNi model, it should be noted that we took an East to West approach with 
our protocols determining the SDNi. This means the controllers communicate with each 
other and base their decisions off the connections and peers. However, there is a vertical 
approach where a row of SDN controllers is in turn controlled by one SDN controller that 
sits on top of the stack. This one controller will then issue commands in a decomposition 
method controlling the network as a whole. “The master controller has a global view of 
the network across all connected SDN domains and can orchestrate the configuration in 
each domain [36].” We chose the horizontal approach because… 
We integrated our designs into the OpenFlow protocol that is a decoupled design 
with the control plane and data (or forwarding) plane separated. The controllers in this 
design utilize this control plane in the secure channel to issue commands and our 
networking flow rules. While the clients and hosts received and issues these commands 
from the flow table on the forwarding plane. This study shows the ports with the protocol 
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provided by the ONF manage the switches and communicate with the controllers with the 
fields All, Controller, Table, In_Port, Any, and Local which have subfields. Briefly 
describing the SDN vulnerabilities should be expanded upon in future research. Very 
little is discussed about the current limitations of the flow table design and the hardware 
limitations behind it as well.  
Future Work 
The main contribution of this study is using the firewall logic in Table 5 and 
combining it with psuedocode to provide a flexible, misconfiguration-tolerant SDN 
firewall. A real-world implementation of the paper prototype could use a NOX C++ 
controller; create flow tables with firewall rule logic added into the set-field to ensure the 
application does not drop due to not adding in a rule allowing for traffic on port 443. We 
can implement firewall policies and ACL’s by programming the SDN controller and 
switch. The policies and logic tree matrixes would work at a top level logic inside the 
SDN controller communicating to the switches flow table. This means the decision 
making process would start from the horizontal SDNi chain of controllers and work 
downward towards the switches. Future work should consist of research into 
manipulating the set-field option within SDN. “While not strictly required, the support of 
rewriting various header fields using Set-Field actions greatly increases the usefulness of 
an OpenFlow implementation [13].”  
This Set-Field option is what allows us to apply our modifications to the 
outermost header of the packet and VLAN header as well. Creating a simple forward 
flow firewall policy function we are able to forward packets based on simple logic trees. 
However, despite the scalability is built into the SDN architecture, in practice hardware 
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limitations may be reached around four thousand flow tables [37]. Depending on the 
usage of CPU and memory with the controllers and switches depends on the maximum 
number of flows a developer could achieve. 
A large research project should be undertaken with the SDN firewall proposals. 
There are many excellent ideas and proposals but nothing substantial to initiate an 
aggregation of project papers and developers to pursue this solution. This thesis should 
spawn a research initiative to begin solving the complex logic trees and limitation of the 
SDN switches and their number of flow tables and policies. Hongxin Hu from Arizona 
State University said, “The goal of this work is to design and develop a systematic 
solution for building reliable firewalls that enable effective network-wide access control 
in SDNs [38].” The research they are presenting is how to configure firewalls within 
SDN environments first and then optimize the firewall after the implementation.  
Conclusion 
This study proposes future work of developing a SDN solution for traditional 
networks that incorporate firewall rules into the flow tables. One application dedicated to 
the monitoring of this would be created with the outline of the pseudocode and placed on 
the SDN controller. Using the OpenFlow protocol and SDNi, the controller would be able 
to make firewall access decisions automated for basic or advanced scenarios.  
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APPENDIX A 
USING SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKING TO SOLVE 
MISSED FIREWALL ARCHITECTURE 
IN LEGACY NETWORKS 
OpenFlow Pipeline Example 
 
Denotes how the set-field action takes place. 
cookie=0x0, duration=642.651s, table=0, n_packets=30, n_bytes=2586, send_flow_rem 
tun_id=0x1,in_port=2 actions=goto_table:20 
 cookie=0x0, duration=563.287s, table=0, n_packets=30, n_bytes=2586, send_flow_rem 
in_port=3,dl_src=fa:16:3e:1c:fc:3b actions=set_field:0x1->tun_id,goto_table:10 
 cookie=0x0, duration=644.372s, table=0, n_packets=37, n_bytes=4198, send_flow_rem 
in_port=1,dl_src=fa:16:3e:e6:a8:9f actions=set_field:0x1->tun_id,goto_table:10 
 cookie=0x0, duration=562.906s, table=0, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, send_flow_rem 
priority=8192,in_port=3 actions=drop 
 cookie=0x0, duration=644.197s, table=0, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, send_flow_rem 
priority=8192,in_port=1 actions=drop 
 cookie=0x0, duration=4641.604s, table=0, n_packets=125, n_bytes=11125, 
send_flow_rem dl_type=0x88cc actions=CONTROLLER:56 
 cookie=0x0, duration=643.569s, table=10, n_packets=33, n_bytes=3356, send_flow_rem 
priority=8192,tun_id=0x1 actions=goto_table:20
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 cookie=0x0, duration=642.293s, table=10, n_packets=19, n_bytes=1614, send_flow_rem 
priority=16384,tun_id=0x1,dl_dst=01:00:00:00:00:00/01:00:00:00:00:00 
actions=output:2,goto_table:20 
 cookie=0x0, duration=490.806s, table=10, n_packets=15, n_bytes=1814, send_flow_rem 
tun_id=0x1,dl_dst=fa:16:3e:c8:c8:26 actions=output:2,goto_table:20 
 cookie=0x0, duration=643.162s, table=20, n_packets=15, n_bytes=1814, send_flow_rem 
priority=8192,tun_id=0x1 actions=drop 
 cookie=0x0, duration=643.71s, table=20, n_packets=43, n_bytes=3658, send_flow_rem 
priority=16384,tun_id=0x1,dl_dst=01:00:00:00:00:00/01:00:00:00:00:00 
actions=output:1,output:3 
 cookie=0x0, duration=643.931s, table=20, n_packets=24, n_bytes=2084, send_flow_rem 
tun_id=0x1,dl_dst=fa:16:3e:e6:a8:9f actions=output:1 
 cookie=0x0, duration=562.286s, table=20, n_packets=15, n_bytes=1814, 
tun_id=0x1,dl_dst=fa:16:3e:1c:fc:3b actions=output:3 
OpenFlow Pseudo Code Pipeline 
BOOLEAN Change Application Network (Application){ 
 IF (App.HasChanged) AND {FlowPolicy.Firewall = 
FlowPolicyAcceptance 
  Then  
   Controller.UpdateFlowPolicy  
   Controller.SwitchFlowTableUpdate 
   RETURN TRUE; 
 ELSE IF FlowPolicy.Firewall != FlowPolicyAcceptance  
  THEN  
   App.FirewallHybrid 
   Controller.UpdateFlowPolicy 
   Controller.SwitchFlowTableUpdate 
   RETURN TRUE; 
 ELSE  
  Controller.DoNotUpdateFlowPolicy 
  Controller.SwitchFlowTableUnchanged 
  RETURN FALSE; 
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𝑓(𝐴𝑝𝑝1): 𝑆𝐶1∆(𝑁1 ∨ 𝐹1) → 𝑓(𝑃𝐶𝑌): 𝑆𝐶1 ∩ 𝐹1 = 𝑃𝐴 → 𝑆𝐶1∆(𝑆𝑊1 ∧ 𝐹1) ~ 𝑃𝐶𝑌
= 𝑃𝑅 → 𝑆𝐶1(𝑆𝑊1 ∧ 𝐹𝑥𝑁) = (𝑃𝐴 ∧  ∆𝑆𝐶1)   ~ 𝑆𝐶1 ∩ 𝑄𝑜𝑆 
→ 𝑆𝐶1(𝑆𝑊1 ∧ 𝐹2)  
OpenFlow Repository 
Stanford University Repository 
http://yuba.stanford.edu/git/gitweb.cgi?p=openflow.git;a=summary 
 
sudo apt-get -y install ssh 
<ssh into your VM> 
 
sudo apt-get install git-core automake m4 pkg-config libtool 
git clone git://openflow.org/openflow.git 
cd openflow 
./boot.sh 
wget http://openflow.org/downloads/openflow-1.0.0.tar.gz 
tar xzf openflow-1.0.0.tar.gz 
cd openflow-1.0.0 
 
sudo apt-get install gcc 
 
./configure 
make 
sudo make install 
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